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Abstract 
Finance committees are the most commonly created voluntary committees of boards. Finance committees 
oversee and advise management on financial issues. We study why firms create finance committees and 
whether firms benefit from using a finance committee. We predict that firms that need finance expertise 
would benefit the most from having a finance committee, and thus, are more likely to form such a 
committee. We find that firms are more likely to have a finance committee when they have derivatives, 
defined benefit pension plans, high leverage and credit ratings, and active dividend payout. We examine 
the impact of finance committees on investment performance using two proxies, investment efficiency 
and capital expenditure (capex) guidance quality. We find that firms with a temporary finance committee 
invest more efficiently and provide capex guidance more frequently. We find no association between 
finance committee use and capex forecast issuance, accuracy and precision.  
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1. Introduction  
We study the determinants and consequences of firms’ use of finance committees of their directors. 
Corporate directors conduct many governance responsibilities in their firm’s committees and 
subcommittees rather than involving the full board. Since 2003, U.S. public companies are required to 
have audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees, each composed entirely of 
independent directors. Many firms voluntarily create other committees, presumably estimating their net 
benefits to be positive. Since the most common voluntary committee is a finance committee, we study 
why and when firms create them. 
Many influential firms have instituted finance committees, suggesting that this is an important 
emerging governance mechanism. General Electric (GE) established a Finance & Capital Allocation 
Committee in December 2017 to oversee significant M&A activity and other capital allocation decisions, 
such as investments, buybacks, and dividends (GE 2018). Some of the new finance committee’s duties 
were previously handled by the full board as we illustrate in Appendix A.1 Pozen (2018) attributes GE’s 
recent pension deficit and cash flow drain at least partially to its late adoption of a finance committee.2 
Since firms likely vary in the financial issues that would benefit from the monitoring and advice of a 
dedicated committee, we think it is important to document the issues that appear to matter most. 
We sample the proxy statements of firms that have a finance committee to understand their goals and 
composition. Finance committees engage in mostly finance-related matters and are mainly composed of 
financial experts. Commonly cited responsibilities include investment policies, financing decisions, 
payout policy, capital structure, and risk management. Many firms call it a “Finance Committee” 
although other common names include “Investment Committee,” “Risk Management Committee,” and 
“Merger and Acquisitions Committee.” In our main sample of over thirty thousand unregulated U.S. 
                                                          
1 GE’s Finance and Capital Allocation Committee will be dissolved as the board has decided to dissolve the committee and to 
reallocate its responsibilities to the full board and audit committee (GE 2019). 
2 Pozen (2018) published on July 17, 2018 after GE adopted the finance committee in December 2017. He argues that GE “had 
struggled to cope with the cash flow drain from years of problematic acquisitions, divestitures, and buybacks” because “the 
structure and processes of the GE board were poorly designed for effectively overseeing Immelt and his management team.” One 
of the problems he points out is that the board had no finance committee. In addition, he also argues that the board was too big 
and the board’s audit committee wasn’t paying attention. 
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public firms from 2003 to 2017, 13% have a finance committee. This proportion accounts for about 40% 
of the sample market value, indicating that finance committees are especially popular in large companies. 
Many firms retain their finance committee as a standing committee, but others dissolve the finance 
committee after a few years.  
We first examine why firms have a finance committee. Proxy statements suggest that finance 
committees are created deliberately (e.g., to address specific issues).3 For instance, Verizon created a 
finance committee to increase oversight of the company’s cash flows and liquidity because the company 
was going to incur significant additional debt to complete an acquisition (Appendix B). If finance 
committees exist to increase oversight and better advise on financial issues, we expect that firms with 
problematic financial-matters are most likely to adopt them. Specifically, we argue that complex firms 
with intense finance-related work are more likely to have a finance committee. Motivated by reading 
hundreds of proxy statements of firms with a finance committee, we examine financial complexity, debt 
financing, payout policy, and investment activity as potential determinants of having a finance committee. 
In our sample, firms are more likely to have a finance committee when they have derivatives, defined 
benefit pension plans, high leverage and credit rating, and active dividend payout. This is consistent with 
our prediction that firms that need financial expertise are more likely to have a finance committee. 
Furthermore, we find that a CEO’s MBA degree, board size and independence as well as firm size and 
age are positively associated with the existence of a finance committee. We also investigate whether the 
determinants are different for standing committees and temporary committees and find that investments 
(i.e., R&D expenses) affect permanency of a finance committee.  
Next, we investigate whether companies benefit from having a finance committee. If creating a 
finance committee makes directors more effective, we expect finance committees to improve firm 
performance on average. Prior studies document a positive association between the financial expertise of 
                                                          
3 Many firms, but not all, list their reasons why they create a finance committee. For example, Verizon adopted a finance 
committee in November 2013 and explained why in its next proxy statement (Version 2014): “Because the Company was going 
to incur significant additional debt in order to complete this acquisition, the Board determined that it should increase its oversight 
of the Company’s cash flows and liquidity through the creation of a Finance Committee of Directors with significant financial 
expertise.” 
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audit committees and financial reporting quality (Xie, Davidson, and DaDalt 2003; Bedard, Chtourou, 
and Courteau 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Badolato, Donelson, and Ege 2014). Similarly, 
bringing together a group of financial experts in a finance committee to guide management should 
ultimately improve financial performance. However, boards without such committees might monitor and 
advise management on financial matters at the board level or through other mandatory committees, such 
as an audit committee.4 Firms might also form a finance committee to imitate influential companies rather 
than with a specific purpose. Therefore, it is an empirical question whether a finance committee improves 
financial performance. 
We examine the impact of finance committees on investment performance because the main 
responsibilities of finance committees are often related to investment policies and capital allocation. 
Specifically, we examine the impact of having a finance committee on investment efficiency and the 
quality of capital expenditure (capex) guidance. We find that firms with a temporary finance committee 
deviate less from the expected investment level, which indicates higher investment efficiency. Second, we 
examine whether firms with a finance committee have better capex guidance. We use four proxies for the 
quality of capex guidance--likelihood , frequency, accuracy, and precision--and find mixed evidence. We 
find a positive association between the use of temporary finance committees and frequency of capex 
forecasts. The remaining three proxies are not significantly associated with finance committee use. Given 
the mixed evidence, we infer that finance committees improve investment decisions but not by much.  
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to study finance committees as an independent topic. We 
expect this study to advance our understanding of boards by examining a new way that boards improve 
their efficiency. Considering that the finance committee is voluntarily created by firms, the active use of 
finance committees suggests that boards are not simply a static governance form. Rather, we provide 
evidence that boards evolve to respond to new environments and to perform their monitoring and 
advisory roles. The limited evidence of positive impacts of the finance committee suggests that having a 
                                                          
4Some firms name the audit committee as ‘audit and finance committee’ and include oversight of finance related issues as the 
main responsibilities, suggesting that boards self-organize their functioning endogenously in different ways.  
4 
 
separate committee for finance matters is not always ideal. Boards at some firms can provide enough 
advice without delegating their jobs to a specific committee.  
Section 2 provides background information. Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
data. Sections 5 and 6 present research design and empirical results for the determinants and 
consequences of the finance committee, respectively. Section 7 provides additional analyses and section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Background information  
2.1. Literature review on board committees 
Board committees have long been used. Since 1940, the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) has recommended that firms establish an audit committee comprised of independent 
directors. Since 1978, The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has required all listed firms to have an 
audit committee (Birkett 1986). Starting in 2003, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed, the 
major stock exchanges mandated that firms have compensation and governance committees in addition to 
an audit committee. Thus, since 2003, US public companies have been required to have three board 
committees: audit, compensation, and governance. Even before the mandatory regime, 32 and 87 percent 
of US companies already had audit committees in 1970, and 1976, respectively (Mautz and Neuman 
1977). NASDAQ firms also voluntarily formed audit committees when they were not required (Pincus, 
Rusbarsky, and Wong 1989). The long history of regulations pushing for such committees, along with 
companies’ active use of them, suggests the usefulness and benefits of having committees under boards.  
Committees have pros and cons for firms. Compared to boards, committees are smaller and have 
more specific responsibilities (Klein 1998). Reeb and Upadhyay (2001) argue that committees reduce the 
communication challenges and lack of participation often found on boards, especially large ones. They 
find that in firms with large boards, having multiple committees under the board can offset the negative 
associations between board size and firm performance. Chen and Wu (2016) examine benefits and costs 
of committees. They argue that benefits include knowledge specialization and increased accountability of 
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the board through efficient task allocation, and costs include information segregation. Committee usage 
could have other costs as well; for instance, having multiple committees comes with financial expense to 
the firms because the board needs to support the committees’ activities and compensate the directors who 
sit on those committees.  
Committees are becoming increasingly common. Adams, Ragunathan, and Rumarkin (2017) 
document a dramatic increase in the total number of committee meetings per year after SOX. Chen and 
Wu (2016) report the frequencies of specified committees in U.S. public firms from 2001 to 2013. The 
most frequently used committees after the three required ones are executive, finance, and strategy, and 12 
percent of the sample uses a finance committee.5 Other voluntary committees include environment, 
health, safety, technology, public policy, pension, M&A, litigation, diversity, and loan. The diversity of 
committees and specificity of their names suggest that firms use different committees for different needs.  
 
2.2. Introducing finance committees 
In this section, we describe how we identify finance committees, introduce different types of 
finance committees, and show a distribution of finance committees by industry and year. To identify 
whether each firm has a finance committee, we downloaded a complete list of committees in BoardEx 
and develop a keyword list to define a finance committee. The keywords include “finance,” “invest,” 
“acquisition,” “M&A,” “merger,” “asset,” “budget,” “capital,” “credit,” “risk,” “loan,” and “pension.” We 
coded the variable Finance Committee as 1 if a firm has a committee whose name includes one or more of 
the keywords.   
Some firms retain finance committees permanently while others dissolve the committee a few 
years after their adoption. As incentives and functions might vary with committee permanence, we 
partition finance committees into permanent if the committee lasts for over 80 percent of the period since 
                                                          
5 The most frequently used committee after the three required ones in Chen and Wu (2016) is executive committee. Chen and Wu 
(2016) explain that executive committee is composed of the chair, the CEO, officers, and a few outside directors to act on behalf 
of the board when the full board cannot meet. Given that the executive committee is operating party of the boards, we argue that 
finance committees are the most frequently used voluntary committee throughout this paper.  
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it was created to the end of sample period, and temporary otherwise.6 In our sample, the average duration 
of a finance committee is about ten years, and 90 percent of the remaining period. 
Figure1 breaks down the use of finance committees by industry. About fifteen (two) percent of 
firms have a permanent (temporary) finance committee, and the remaining 83 percent do not have a 
finance committee. We find a higher proportion of firms with a finance committee in the utilities and 
financial industries, 45 percent and 26 percent, respectively. Permanent committees are much more 
common than temporary committees in all industries.  
Figure 2 shows ten most common titles of finance committees along with proportion of each title 
keyword by year for regulated and unregulated industries separately. We use Fama-French 12 industry 
classification. Regulated industries include the utilities and financial industries. In unregulated industries, 
the most common title is “finance committee” followed by “investments committee.” In regulated 
industries, the keyword “risk” became more dominant than “financ” since 2011, likely because the 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors has required certain bank holding companies to establish a risk 
committee since 2015.7 The differing titles of finance committees between the two groups suggests that 
risk management might be the top priority for regulated industries whereas finance and investment 
decisions might be the focal issues for unregulated industries.   
Panels A and B of Figure 3 show the frequencies of finance committees by year for unregulated 
and regulated industries, respectively. We display both equal-weighted and market-value-weighted 
proportions of firms with a finance committee. In Panel A, on average about 13% of unregulated firms 
use a finance committee every year.8 Firms with a finance committee account for about 40 percent of the 
                                                          
6 This ex-post measure uses observed duration to define permanence. Because firms rarely label a committee as ad hoc even if 
they intend it to be temporary, we do not have a good ex-ante basis to partition finance committees. 
7 On February 18, 2014, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors adopted rules implementing risk committee requirements for 
certain entities including: publicly traded nonbank financial companies supervised by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
publicly traded bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $10 billion or more,  and publicly traded bank holding 
companies with total consolidated assets of less than $10 billion where Federal Reserve Board of Governors has determined that 
establishment of risk committee is necessary. 
(https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/formsreview/RegYY_20120105_ifr.pdf) 
8 On average, 43 firms create a finance committee every year (untabulated). We find more adopters in the earlier years, but there 
are new adopters every year through 2017.  
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unregulated sample market value, indicating that large firms disproportionately use finance committees. 
In both graphs, permanent (temporary) finance committees are becoming more (less) common. Finance 
committee frequencies in regulated industries are presented in Panel B. About 25 percent of regulated 
firms had a finance committee in the early 2000s and this proportion grew until recently. Over 50 percent 
of regulated firms by market value had a finance committee in 2003 and the proportion increased to 67 
percent in 2017. Since we are interested in the voluntary adoption of finance committees, we exclude 
regulated industries in our subsequent analyses, and leave the separate study of finance committees in 
regulated industries to future studies. 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
3.1. The determinants of having a finance committee 
As established above, firms use committees for various reasons. We expect that firms in great 
need of finance expertise would benefit the most from having a finance committee, and thus, are more 
likely to form such a committee. Although prior studies have not examined this possibility directly, they 
document that firms with a strong need for finance or accounting knowledge and skills hire executives 
withexpertise in those fields (Li, Sun, and Ettredge 2010; Hoitash, Hoitash, and Kurt 2016; Bernard, Ge, 
Matsumoto and Toynbee 2018). Boone and Mulherin (2017) document that target firms use special 
committees during corporate takeovers. Similarly, finance committees could also be used to meet these 
needs, either as an alternative or supplement to hiring executives with the desired expertise.  
To understand firms’ motivations for forming a finance committee, we examined their proxy 
statements. We looked at sections where firms describe the purpose, goals, and responsibilities of each 
committee of the board. By reading a couple hundred proxy statements for thirty companies, we identified 
four recurring themes, or potential driving factors, to study:  financial complexity, debt financing, payout 
policy, and investment activity. Appendix B quotes proxy statements to motivate each hypothesis.  
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In the first hypothesis, we predict that firms with high financial complexity are more likely to have a 
finance committee. We consider derivative usage, a foreign exchange activity, use of defined benefit 
(DB) pension plans, and deferred tax as proxies for financial complexity.  
Derivatives can be useful for risk management (Guay 1999; Bodnar, Hayt, Marston, and 
Smithson 1995; Bartram, Brown, and Fehle 2004), but they can also create risk, especially if not properly 
used (Stulz 2004). The prevalence of derivative use and difficulty of derivative management suggest 
derivate usage as a determinant of having a finance committee. In this context, we also expect firms with 
foreign exchange activity to be more likely to have a finance committee because globally-diversified 
firms often use derivatives to reduce exchange-rate risk exposure (Denies, Denies and Yost 2002; Choi 
and Jiang 2009). 
Pensions account for a significant portion of firms’ costs (Sundaram and Yermack 2007). Unlike 
defined contribution (DC) plans, DB plans impose investment risks of the fund assets on the sponsoring 
firms. Therefore, firms that have DB plans may benefit from having extra advice from a finance 
committee.  
Tax avoidance is a red flag for earnings management. Phillips (2003) document that deferred tax 
expense is associated with avoiding losses or meeting analysts’ forecasts. If firms that have large deferred 
tax expenses or that avoid taxes aggressively are more likely to manage earnings, their shareholders 
should worry about transparency, and thus be more likely to support an extra board committee. We thus 
expect the degree of tax avoidance to be positively associated with the likelihood of having a finance 
committee. All of this leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1. Firms with high financial complexity are more likely to have a finance committee.  
In the second hypothesis, we examine leverage, credit ratings, and issuance of debt as proxies for 
reliance on external funding. Firms with high leverage have greater advising requirements (Pfeffer 1971). 
Experts such as bankers on boards help firms to access external funds (Booth and Deli 1999; Güner, 
Malmendier, and Tate 2008). We argue that finance committees can provide similar advice (if not more), 
and thus, firms seeking external funds would benefit from having such a committee. Similarly, firms that 
9 
 
need external funds or that are currently using debt have incentives to manage their credit ratings. We 
expect finance committees to provide helpful advice on credit rating management and thus predict an 
association between credit ratings and having a finance committee. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 H2. Firms with high reliance on external funds are more likely to have a finance committee. 
Payout policy is yet another critical decision of firms. Good governance can be particularly 
important in payout policy because dividend payout involves agency conflicts (Jensen 1986). 
Shareholders would institute a finance committee to ensure that managers do not adopt a suboptimal 
dividend policy. As more firms mix dividends and share repurchases (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner 
2008; Skinner 2008; Kahle and Stulz 2017), managers also need to choose the payout form. Based on the 
importance and difficulty of managing payout, we argue that firms with active payout need more advice 
from specialists and, thus, are more likely to use a finance committee. This leads to our third hypothesis: 
H3. Firms with active payout policy are more likely to have a finance committee. 
Investment is arguably the most highly related to finance committee’s agenda. Not only 
responsibilities of the finance committee almost always include investment related duties but also many 
firms use an “Investment Committee” label. Investment activities of firms are directly related to the firm’s 
profitability and growth. Managers in a firm with active investments would need advice from experts to 
find good investment projects and to manage current investments. Therefore, we expect to see a higher 
likelihood of having a finance committee for the firms with active investment such as capex, R&D and 
M&A. This leads to our fourth hypothesis: 
H4. Firms with active investments are more likely to have a finance committee. 
 
3.2. The consequences of using a finance committee 
Finance committees are responsible for monitoring and advising the firm’s investment decisions, 
which we use as our main performance proxy. Prior studies document that good governance improves 
firms’ decision-making. Much accounting research has examined the quality of audit committees and its 
impact on accounting and audit performance (Xie, et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Krishnan 2005; 
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Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Dhaliwal, Naiker, and Navissi 2010). Basu and Liang (2018) provide 
causal evidence that outside directors (not just audit committee members) affect conservatism. Whereas 
the main goal of audit committees is to ensure financial reporting quality, finance committees mainly 
oversee and assess finance outcomes. To the extent that a finance committee can help directors be more 
effective in guiding management to high-quality financial decisions, having a finance committee in place 
should lead to better investment decisions made by the firm.  
Researchers have looked at how the financial literacy of boards affects firm performance. Güner 
et al. (2008) document that external funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases 
when commercial bankers join boards. Mangena and Pike (2005) document a significant positive 
association between audit committee financial expertise and interim disclosure. SOX required 
employment and disclosure of financial experts on audit committees to enhance effective financial 
oversight. The reasoning is that directors who possess the skills and experience relevant to the tasks at 
hand will ask more challenging questions and provide better advice to management. By the same logic, a 
finance committee should increase investment quality because it is essentially a group of financial experts 
who meet regularly to oversee and advise the management regarding financial issues, including 
investment decisions.  
Several accounting studies differentiate accounting from nonaccounting financial expertise and 
compare the impacts of both. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009) document that audit fees are lower for 
firms with accounting financial expertise on their audit committees but not for firms with nonaccounting 
financial expertise. Similarly, DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) find a positive market reaction to appointing 
accounting financial experts to audit committees but no reaction to appointing nonaccounting financial 
experts. These studies suggest that nonaccounting financial expertise on audit committees might not have 
a strong impact on audit performance. Arguably, accounting financial expertise (e.g., CPA, controller), as 
opposed to nonaccounting financial expertise (e.g., banking, treasurer), should be more related to 
accounting performance (e.g., financial reporting quality) than to financial performance (e.g., investment 
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outcomes). On the contrary, we predict that finance committees have stronger impact on financial 
performance such as investment performance than on accounting performance. 
To examine consequences of finance committees, we analyze two investment related variables: 
investment efficiency and capex guidance. First, we examine whether firms with a finance committee 
invest more efficiently than those without a committee. Prior studies document that a firm’s financial 
reporting choices and information environment influence its investment efficiency (Biddle, Hilary and 
Verdi 2009; Chen, Hope, Li and Wang 2011; Goodman, Neamtiu, Shroff, and White 2013; Choi, Hann 
and Subasi 2018). Biddle et al. (2009) find that firms with higher financial reporting quality deviate less 
from predicted investment levels. Francis and Martin (2010) document that timely loss recognition is 
positively associated with acquisition profitability. Goodman et al. (2013) document that investment 
efficiency is positively associated with management forecasting quality. In addition to these findings, we 
conjecture that the finance committee is another factor that can impact a firm’s investment efficiency. 
Specifically, if directing members of the finance committee work closely with management in discussing 
investment opportunities and funding options, management should better estimate the value of potential 
investment projects and, accordingly, invest more efficiently. All of this leads to our next hypothesis:  
H5. Firms with a finance committee have higher investment efficiency. 
Second, we examine whether firms with a finance committee provide better capex guidance. 
Management reports the firm’s spending and budgeting plan to the finance committee and seek feedback. 
In such firms, management should have a better idea about future investment plans and be more capable 
of forecasting investment amounts. A better understanding and forecasting of investment projects’ future 
payoffs would help managers provide high-quality capex guidance. To measure capex guidance quality, 
we examine the likelihood of providing capex forecasts, frequency of forecast updates, and accuracy and 
precision of the forecasts. Although management forecasts on other items (e.g., earnings forecast) might 
also be related to having a finance committee, we choose capex guidance because it is more directly 
linked to firm’s investment decisions. This leads to our next hypothesis:  
H6. Firms with a finance committee provide better capex guidance.  
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For some firms, forming a finance committee might not be necessary. That is, some firms might 
be handling their financial decisions well without a finance committee.  Given that investment drives 
value creation (Modigliani and Miller 1958) and boards themselves respond to their environments 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 2001), it is very likely that boards are monitoring and advising investment 
decisions regardless of whether a finance committee is in place. This might be especially true for firms 
that employ many financial experts because then the directors can easily discuss financial matters at board 
meetings. Some firms refer to their audit committee as the “Audit and Finance Committee,” indicating 
that the audit committee is also involved in finance-related matters. Lastly, it is also possible that firms 
create a finance committee to imitate successful firms rather than for any specific function. If any of these 
cases are true, we would not find a positive impact of having a finance committee.   
 
4. Sample selection and data description 
4.1. Sample selection 
We collect data from 2003 to 2017. We start our sample in 2003 for two reasons. First, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) introduced many changes in governance including mandating certain 
board committees and their composition, so we restrict ourselves to a post-SOX sample. Second, 
BoardEx, our main data source for boards and committees, has incomplete coverage before 2002. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents our sample selection procedure. We start with 82,775 firm-year 
observations that have complete data about committees in BoardEx. After excluding observations without 
CIK codes or SIC industry codes, we have 65,571 observations in the combined BoardEx/Compustat 
sample. We dropped utilities and financial firms because of possible regulations regarding board 
committees. After further attrition due to missing financial data, we have 37,902 firm-year observations 
for analyses of finance committee determinants. Sample size is smaller for our consequences tests 
because of data unavailability to construct required variables for each analysis. 
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Accounting and other financial data, including pension data and S&P credit ratings, are taken 
from Compustat. Institutional ownership data are taken from Thomson Reuters 13f filings. Analyst 
forecasts and management guidance data are from the I/B/E/S Detail file. 
 
4.2. Summary statistics about finance committees 
Panels B and C of Table 1 present descriptive statistics on finance committees. We explore the 
accounting and/or finance expertise of boards and committees based on three kinds of experts ─ finance 
expert, accounting expert, and supervisory expert. Following prior literature (DeFond et al. 2005; 
Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008; Badolato et al. 2014), we search for certain keywords in education, 
qualification, and prior employment history of directors on BoardEx. To identify accounting experts, we 
use the following keywords: “CPA,” “accounting,” “accountant,” “accountancy,” “audit,” “controller,” 
“internal control,” “financial report,” and “CFO.” For finance experts, we use the following keywords: 
“finance,” “analyst,” “invest,” “asset,” “capital,” “credit,” “fund,” “loan,” “budget,” “bank,” “treasur.” 
Our definitions of finance experts and accounting experts are narrower than the SEC’s definition of 
financial experts, which include directors who experience supervising and overseeing financial or 
accounting officer.9 We thus include supervisory expert which is coded 1 for the director with supervisory 
expertise using keywords of “CEO” and “president.” Expert is coded 1 if any of the three expertise 
variables is coded 1. .  
In panel B, we examine how board composition changes when firms first adopt a finance 
committee. We use non-adopting years (both before and after adoption) for the same firms as a 
benchmark. In adopting years, board size increases about three percent from the previous year, which is 
more than in non-adopting years. We also observe an increase in the number of both accounting and 
                                                          
9 The SEC defines “financial expert” broadly to include individuals with any experience creating, auditing, using or overseeing 
the creation of financial reports (SEC 2003). The SEC does not list job titles that qualify directors as financial experts, but those 
qualifying include auditors, presidents, CEOs, and CFOs (Krishnan and Visvanathan 1998; DeFond et al. 2005).  
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finance experts in adopting years. In short, at least some boards hire new directors, especially accounting 
and/or finance experts when they create a finance committee. 
Panel C of Table 1 compares the size and composition of finance committees to those of three 
required committees in the same firms. On average, a finance committee has 4.6 directors, which is 
slightly more than of the other committees. 27 percent of finance committee members have accounting 
expertise and 25 percent have finance expertise. Using the broader SEC-style definition which includes 
supervisory experts as well as finance and accounting experts, 89 percent of finance committee members 
are financial experts. Audit committees have more accounting and finance experts on average than 
finance committees, which partially reflects the requirement that audit committees have at least one 
financial expert (SEC 2003). Finance committees have more accounting and finance experts than 
compensation and nominating/governance committees. The last three rows of the table show what 
proportion of the financial experts on a board are allocated to each committee. Boards allocate about 60 
percent of their finance experts to the finance committee. Overall, Panels B and C provide suggestive 
evidence that a finance committee is mainly consist of financial experts who have accounting and/or 
finance background.   
 
5. Determinants of finance committee use 
5.1. Empirical model 
We test four hypotheses on the determinants of having a finance committee using a logit regression: 
Pr⁡(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑐𝑒⁡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 1) 
= 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝛼 +∑𝛽𝑖 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙⁡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦 +∑𝛾𝑗 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡⁡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 +∑𝛿𝑘 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡
+∑𝜃𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦⁡𝐹𝐸),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
where Finance Committee is an indicator variable that takes a value of one (zero) if a firm has (does not 
have) a finance committee. Financial Complexity, Debt Financing, Payout, and Investment label the four 
sets of proxies to test H1 to H4. 
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To test H1, which is that financially complex firms are more likely to have a finance committee, 
we use indicator variables for use of derivatives (Derivative User), existence of foreign operations 
(Foreign), use of defined benefit plans (DBplan User) and level of deferred tax expenses (Deferred 
Tax).10  
To test H2, which is that firms that seek external funds are more likely to have a finance 
committee, we examine the ratio of total debt to equity (Leverage), credit ratings from Standard & Poor’s 
(Ratings) and net debt financing (Debt Financing). The ratings range from AAA (highest rating) to D 
(lowest rating). Following Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006), we collapsed multiple ratings 
into seven categories with seven being the highest and one being the lowest. We assign zero to 
observations with no ratings. We add an indicator variable for observations with missing ratings (Missing 
Ratings) to account for variability in finance committee use by existence of credit ratings.  
To test H3, which is that firms paying out cash are more likely to have a finance committee, we 
include indicator variables for dividend-paying firms (DivPayer) and firms with positive net repurchases 
(Repurchase).  
To test H4, which is that firms with active investments are more likely to have a finance 
committee, we include different investments including capital expenditure (CAPEX) and research and 
development (R&D), indicator variables for having acquisition (Acquisition), divestiture (Divestiture), 
and restructure (Restructure).11 
We control for board characteristics—board size (Baord Size) and independence (Board 
Independence) — that are known to affect committee use (Reeb and Upadhyay 2010; Chen and Wu 
2016). We include institutional ownership (InstOwn) as an external governance proxy. Finally, we include 
firm size proxied by log of market value of equity (LogMVE), firm age (Firm Age) and profitability 
(ROA), risk proxied by standard deviation of market returns (Ret Volatility). We include industry and year 
                                                          
10 Detailed amounts and status of derivatives and pension assets are only available through manual collection from 10-Ks. We 
thus create indicator variables using data items available on Compustat following prior research (Franzoni and Marin 2006; 
Campbell 2015). 
11 Divestitures are not available in Compustat. We instead use discontinued operations (Compustat item DO) to proxy for 
existence of divestitures following Hribar and Collins (2002). 
16 
 
fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Appendix C lists all variables and their 
definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to limit the influence of 
any outliers. 
 We define the variables so that their predicted signs are positive. While not a formal hypothesis, 
we also explore whether top executives’ background is related to the likelihood of having a finance 
committee. Top executives’ backgrounds and styles affect various firm decisions (Bertrand and Schoar 
2003; Bamber, Jian, and Wang 2010; Ge, Matsumoto, and Zhang 2011; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013). 
Therefore, we investigate whether CEOs and CFOs influence this voluntary choice. Specifically, we 
include indicator variables for CEOs and CFOs with an MBA degree (CEO with MBA, CFO with MBA), 
accounting expertise (Accounting Expert CEO, Accounting Expert CFO), and finance expertise (Finance 
Expert CEO, Finance Expert CFO).  
 
5.2. Empirical results 
5.2.1. Descriptive statistics 
In Table 2, we compare potential determinants across three groups of firms: firms without a 
finance committee, firms with a temporary finance committee, and firms with a permanent finance 
committee. Columns (1) through (3) present the average values of each variable for each group and 
columns (4) through (6) show paired sample t-statistics comparing each pair among the three groups.  
Under H1, financially complex firms are expected to use finance committees. First, compared to 
firms with no finance committee, firms with a permanent finance committee have more complex financial 
transactions. The usage of derivatives and defined benefit plans is higher for firms with a finance 
committee. Even among firms that have a finance committee, firms with a permanent committee use 
derivatives and defined benefit plans much more. Overall, the results are consistent with H1. 
In H2, we expect external financing to influence having a finance committee. Firms with a 
permanent finance committee have the highest leverage and the highest credit rating, which are 
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significantly higher than the other two groups. We find no significant differences in the level of new debt 
financing among the three groups.  
H3 predicts active payout policy to influence finance committee use. Consistent with H3, the 
proportions of dividend payout and repurchase increase from firms with no finance committee to firms 
with a temporary committee to firms with a permanent committee.  
Lastly, in H4, we consider active investments to influence having a finance committee. We find 
no significant differences in capex across the three groups. Firms without a finance committee appear to 
spend the most on R&D. We find higher frequencies of acquisitions, divestitures, and restructurings in 
firms that have a finance committee, either permanent or temporary, than in firms without a finance 
committee.  
We find a monotonic increase in board size and independence from no committee to temporary to 
permanent committee. Firms with large, independent boards are more likely to have a finance committee. 
The average values of firm size, ROA, age and institutional ownership are the highest for the group of 
firms with a permanent finance committee followed by firms with a temporary committee then by firms 
without a finance committee. Volatility has the opposite order, no finance committee being the highest 
and permanent committee being the lowest, suggesting that risker firms are less likely to have a finance 
committee contrary to our prediction.  
In addition, we compare CEOs’ and CFOs’ background across the three groups.12 For both CEOs 
and CFOs, firms with a finance committee have a higher percentage of CEOs with an MBA degree than 
firms without a finance committee. In general, CEOs and CFOs in firms without a finance committee 
have more accounting expertise while those in firms with a permanent finance committee have more 
finance expertise.  
 
5.2.2. Tests of finance committee determinants  
                                                          
12 The sample size drops significantly when CEOs’ and CFOs’ background is considered because BoardEx does not have data for 
many executives.  
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Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1). Panel A shows a binary logit model and 
Panel B shows a multinomial logit model. The first four columns in Panel A show the basic model where 
we do not distinguish permanent committees from temporary committees.  
Columns (1) and (2) show the coefficients and marginal effects of each determinant. Use of 
derivatives and defined benefit pension plans, credit ratings, and dividend payment are reliably associated 
with having a finance committee. Firms that use derivatives (defined benefit plans) are 1.3 (2.9) percent 
more likely to have a finance committee than their counterparts. Also, firms with credit ratings are 5.2 
percent more likely to have a finance committee. Dividend payers are 2.2 percent more likely to have a 
finance committee. These results are consistent with our predictions that firms with complex financial 
transactions (H1), high reliance on debt financing (H2), and active payout (H3) are more likely to use a 
finance committee. However, we do not find empirical evidence that investments impact firms’ decision 
on having a finance committee (H4). 
We find that firms with a larger board and a more independent board, larger firms, and more 
mature firms are more likely to have a finance committee. Columns (3) and (4) add CEOs’ and CFOs’ 
backgrounds to the regression. We find similar results for the determinants and controls. The coefficients 
on CEO with MBA and Accounting Expert CEO are statistically significant. Companies whose CEOs have 
an MBA degree are 4.5 percent more likely to have a finance committee whereas firms with an 
accounting expert CEO are 3.2 percent less likely to have a finance committee. It might be that CEOs 
who have an MBA degree acknowledge difficulty and importance of finance related issues and thus are 
more inclined to institute a separate committee to deal with financial issues. 
Columns (5) through (8) of Panel A present logit regression results in a subsample of firms with 
finance committees. The dependent variable is equal to one (zero) if a firm has a permanent (temporary) 
finance committee. This analysis examines the determinants of a permanent committee over a temporary 
committee, conditional on the choice to have a finance committee.  
Financial complexity (H1), debt financing (H2), and payout (H3) do not explain having a 
permanent committee instead of a temporary committee (with exceptions of defined benefit plans and 
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leverage still showing significantly positive marginal impact in one of the two models). In contrast, R&D 
expenses are now statistically significant. This suggests that investment decisions are more related to the 
types of finance committee rather than existence of the committee. Less profitable firms and firms with 
higher institutional ownership are more likely to have a permanent committee. In addition to CEO’s MBA 
degree and accounting expertise, CFO’s financial expertise is also an important factor for having a 
permanent committee. Firms with a finance expert CFO are 4.4 percent more likely to have a permanent 
committee. 
In addition to binary logit models, we also use multinomial logit regression, which lets us to 
consider cases where companies choose directly between no finance committee, a permanent finance 
committee, and a temporary finance committee. In the previous binary models, we assumed two-stage 
decision making (i.e., firms first decide whether to have a finance committee, and then choose between 
permanent and temporary). The results are shown in Panel B. Columns (1) and (3) compare temporary 
committees to firms with no finance committees while columns (2) and (4) compare permanent 
committees to the same base group.  
When temporary committees are compared to the base group, almost none of the main 
determinants (H1-H4) is significant. Only the coefficients on Missing Ratings, Acquisition and DivPayer 
are significantly positive in one of the two models. When permanent committees are compared to the base 
group of no committees, we find similar results from the binary logit model. DBPlan User, Leverage, 
Missing Ratings, and DivPayer have significant coefficients with the predicted signs, supporting our first 
three hypotheses on finance committee determinants.13  
 
6. Consequences of finance committee use 
                                                          
13 Across all models, the coefficient on Foreign consistently shows a negative sign, suggesting that firms with no foreign 
operations are less likely to have a finance committee. This is inconsistent with our prediction that firms with foreign operations, 
which are more complex firms, are more likely to have a finance committee.  
20 
 
As shown in the determinant analysis, firms that have a finance committee differ from those that 
do not. We used the estimated coefficients from our determinants model to derive propensity scores for 
using finance committees.14 We use these propensity scores to match our samples of firms with and 
without finance committees, so that we can isolate the incremental effect of a finance committee. 
6.1. Investment efficiency 
6.1.1. Empirical model 
H5 is that firms with a finance committee will invest more efficiently. We investigate whether 
having a finance committee reduces firms’ deviations from their expected investment levels. Following 
Biddle et al. (2009), we model investment as a function of growth opportunities (as measured by sales 
growth).15  
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠⁡𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1⁡(2) 
Where Investmenti,t+1 is total investment (i.e., sum of R&D expenditure, capital expenditure, and 
acquisition expenditure) and Sales Growthi,t is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to t. Equation 
(3) is estimated on each industry-year based on Fama and French 48 industries with at least 30 
observations in a given industry-year. We use absolute value of the residuals (i.e., deviations from 
predicted investment) as a continuous measure of investment inefficiency. We also create an indicator 
that equals one if the absolute residual is above the median because measurement error in this proxy could 
be high (Erickson and Whited 2006; Goodman et al. 2013). Lastly, we create a change variable that 
compares the absolute residuals of year t and t+1. Using these three measures to proxy for investment 
inefficiency, we estimate the following Logit (for binary variable) and OLS (for continuous variables) 
regressions: 
                                                          
14 We perform 1-to-1 matching without replacement using nearest-neighbor (without caliper).  
15 Following Bae, Biddle and Park (2018), we also use an alternative model where investment inefficiency is measured by the 
absolute value of residuals from a regression of firm’s capital expenditures on Tobin’s Q and cash flow from operations. The 
results are qualitatively similar.  
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𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡⁡𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖,𝑡+1
= 𝜌0 + 𝜌1 ∗ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌2 ∗ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦⁡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜏𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3) 
Invest Inefficiencyi,t+1 is one of the three measures defined above. Permanent Finance Committeei,t  
is an indicator that equals one if a firm has a permanent finance committee in year t. Temporary Finance 
Committeei,t  is an indicator variable that equals one if a firm has a temporary finance committee in year t. 
Controli,t  is a vector of firm characteristics that might affect investment efficiency. If a finance committee 
mitigates under- and/or over-investment, 𝜌1 and/or 𝜌2 will be negative.  
We follow prior studies (Biddle et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011; Goodman et al. 2013) to control for 
the following firm characteristics. We include institutional ownership (InstOwn), analyst following 
(Analyst Following), and board size (Board Size) because good governance is negatively associated with 
over- and/or under-investment. We include cash flow volatility (OCF Volatility), sales volatility (Sales 
Volatility), and investment volatility (Invest Volatility) to control for firm uncertainty. We include 
controls for basic firm characteristics such as log of total asset (LogAsset), market-to-book ratio (MtoB), 
firm age (Firm Age), firm’s operating cycle (OprCycle), asset tangibility (Tangible), cash flow from 
operations divided by sales (OCF to Sale), and whether the firm has reported negative earnings (Loss). 
Since firm liquidity affects investment decisions, we control for capital structure (K-structure) and 
financial slack (Financial Slack). Lastly, we control for number of committees (NCommittees) to rule out 
the possibility that results reflect a firm having many committees rather than a finance committee 
specifically. Appendix C provides detailed variable definitions. We winsorize all continuous variables at 
the bottom and top 1% level. Industry and year fixed effects are included, and standard errors are 
clustered by firm.  
 
6.1.2. Empirical results 
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Since our sample is smaller than before, Panel A of Table 4 lists descriptive statistics for the 
investment efficiency sample. The firm characteristics of the new sample are similar to that of the earlier 
sample. In Panel B, we compare investment inefficiency across three groups ─ firms without a finance 
committee, firms with a temporary finance committee, and firms with a permanent finance committee. 
For the investment inefficiency indicator, mild differences are found for overinvestment. For the 
continuous variable, firms with a permanent committee (temporary committee) seem to have more (less) 
efficient investment than firms without a finance committee.  
Next, we estimate logistic and OLS regressions of investment inefficiency on finance committee. 
The results of estimating equation (4) are presented in Panel C. Overall, the coefficients on Permanent 
Finance Committee and Temporary Finance Committee are negative as predicted, but they are in most 
cases not statistically significant. For the indicator variable, the coefficient on Temporary Finance 
Committee in column (1) is -0.266 with marginal effects of -0.066, indicating that firms with a temporary 
finance committee are 6.6 percent less likely to make an inefficient investment. In column (4), the 
coefficient is -0.420 with marginal effects of -0.105. That is, firms with a temporary finance committee 
are 10.5 percent less likely to involve in underinvestment. Temporary Finance Committee continues to 
show negative coefficient (-2.255) in column (9) for change variable. In sum, the results of our test of H5 
provide some evidence that having a temporary finance committee mitigates inefficient investment, but 
we cannot draw a clear conclusion given the weak and inconsistent empirical results. 
The coefficients on NCommittees are negative in most cases, suggesting that having more 
committees mitigates investment inefficiency problems. This is consistent with the findings that 
committee use can reduce costs of large board (Reeb and Upadhyay 2001). Investment inefficiency is 
negatively correlated with analyst following (Analyst Following) and institutional ownership (InstOwn), 
suggesting that analysts and institutional investors help mitigate investment inefficiency, consistent with 
prior studies (Derrien and Kecskés 2013; Chen, Harford, and Lin 2015). The coefficients on the other 
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control variables are generally in line with those found in the prior research (Biddle and Hilary 2006; 
Biddle et al., 2009; Choi et al. 2018).  
 
6.2. Quality of capex guidance 
6.2.1. Empirical model 
H6 is that firms with a finance committee will provide better capex guidance. To study how 
having a finance committee affects capex guidance quality, we estimate an OLS regression: 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥⁡𝐺𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜎0 + 𝜎1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡⁡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜎2𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦⁡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒⁡𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
For the dependent variable, Capex Guidance Quality, we use four different proxies: issuance of 
capex guidance (Capex Issuance), frequency of capex guidance (NForecast), capex forecast error 
(Forecast Error), capex forecast range (Forecast Range). Capex Issuance is equal to one if a firm 
provides at least one capex guidance for the fiscal year t, and zero otherwise. NForecast is the number of 
capex guidance made by firm i for fiscal year t. Forecast Range measures capex forecast precision as the 
absolute value of the difference between the upper and lower bounds of range capex forecasts. For a point 
forecast, the upper and lower bounds of the forecast range are equal, so Forecast Range is zero. Forecast 
Error measures capex forecast accuracy as the absolute value of the difference between management 
forecasted capex and actual capex. We use midpoint for range forecasts. We scale Forecast Error and 
Forecast Range by beginning of year net property, plant, and equipment.16 Permanent Finance 
Committeei,t and Temporary Finance Committeei,t were defined previously.  
                                                          
16 For multiple forecasts made for the same fiscal year, we use both average and initial forecast, but report only the results with 
average value. The results are qualitatively similar when initial forecast errors and precision are calculated using initial forecasts. 
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For the issuance of guidance and number of forecasts, we predict positive 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 because 
more forecasts and more frequent updates guide investors better. For the forecast accuracy and precision, 
we predict negative 𝜎1 and 𝜎2 because smaller forecast error (forecast range) indicates more accurate 
(precise) guidance.  
We follow prior studies (Lu and Tucker 2012; Ali, Fan and Li 2018) and control for firm 
performance (ROA and Loss), firm size (LogAsset), investment opportunity (TobinQ), leverage 
(Leverage), firm performance uncertainty proxied by stock returns volatility and analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion (Ret Volatility and Analyst Dispersion), information demand from analysts and institutional 
shareholders (Analyst Following and InstOwn), asset tangibility (Tangible), and investment volatility 
(Invest Volatility). We include number of committees (NCommittees) and board size (Board Size) because 
these two variables are correlated with having a finance committee. As in earlier models, we include 
industry and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors by firm. 
 
6.2.2. Empirical results 
Since our sample changes again, Panel A of Table 5 lists descriptive statistics for the capex 
guidance sample. The descriptive statistics indicate that firms in the capex guidance sample are larger and 
healthier than the firms in the investment efficiency analysis. Other firm characteristics are generally 
similar. In Panel B, we compare four proxies for capex guidance quality across three groups: firms 
without a finance committee, firms with a temporary finance committee, and firms with a permanent 
finance committee. Although the differences are in the predicted direction, most of the differences are not 
statistically significant. Only in the change in number of forecasts, firms with a temporary committee 
appear to increase frequency more than the other two groups. 
In Panel C, we present the results of Logit (for binary variable of capex Issuance) and OLS (for 
all the other continuous dependent variables) regressions. Although the coefficients on our main 
25 
 
variables, Permanent Finance Committee and Temporary Finance Committee, generally have the 
predicted sign, they are not statistically significant. Only in column (2) where the dependent variable is 
NForecast, the 0.517 coefficient on Temporary Finance Committee indicates that firms with a temporary 
finance committee provide 0.5 more forecast than do firms without a finance committee. This increase 
seems quite large given that the standard deviation of number of forecasts is 2.36. 
The effects of control variables are generally consistent with prior studies. Firms in a more 
uncertain environment (Analyst Dispersion) tend to provide less frequent, less accurate and less precise 
forecasts. Capital-intensive firms (Tangible) and large firms (LogAsset) are more likely to issue capex 
forecasts that are more accurate and precise.  
 
7. Additional analysis 
The empirical results in the tests of investment efficiency and capex guidance imply no strong 
average impact of having a finance committee on investment performance. In this section, we run several 
subsample analyses to test whether the impacts are context-specific.  
First, we use a narrower definition of a finance committee. As we focus on investment 
performance, we exclude committees that are less related to investment. Specifically, among the twelve 
keywords we use to identify finance committees, we select only “finance”, “invest”, “acquisition”, 
“M&A”, and “merger.”17 The new variables are labeled as Permanent Investment Committee and 
Temporary Investment Committee. We expect the impact of investment committees on investment is 
stronger than that of finance committees more broadly because some finance committees (e.g., pensions 
committee) might not be involved in investment decisions. 
                                                          
17 We continue to include “financ” because “finance committees” seem to have broad functions including investment as well as 
other non-investment related matters as reported in the proxy statements (see Appendix A and B).  
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Second, we examine whether the impact of a finance committee is concentrated in adopting years. 
In the consequences analysis, the empirical results suggest that only temporary committees affect 
investment performance. Temporary committees might be more purpose-driven than permanent 
committees because directors organize the committee to solve a specific problem and then dissolve the 
committee once the goal is achieved. similarly, the influence of finance committees might be stronger in 
earlier years if boards create a committee to deal with current issues. Therefore, we introduce an 
additional indicator variable, Finance Committee Adopt Year, which is equal to one if it is the first year of 
having a finance committee.  
Third, we examine whether finance committee size is associated with the impact of having a 
finance committee. More directors on a finance committee (up to some point) are likely to enhance 
committee performance. We use size of a finance committee, measured by number of directors in a 
finance committee divided by total number of directors on boards, as a proxy for committee 
involvement.18 This proxy measures how much weight is given to a finance committee. We create 
indicator variables, Large Finance Committee (Small Finance Committee) which takes a value of one if 
committee size is above (below) median, and zero otherwise. The baseline group is firms without finance 
committees.  
Fourth, we examine whether finance committee composition affects outcomes. For example, 
financial expertise might help finance committee members improve firm investment performance. We 
calculate the proportion of financial experts on finance committees, and create an indicator, Strong 
Finance Committee (Weak Finance Committee), which equals to one if the proportion of financial experts 
in the finance committee is above (below) the median, and zero otherwise.19 The baseline group is firms 
without finance committees.  
                                                          
18 Number of committee meetings would be a more direct measure of committee activity. Unfortunately, this information is not 
readily available on BoardEx and would require manual collection of data.  
19 We use a broad definition that includes accounting experts, finance experts, directors with an MBA degree, and directors who 
are identified as financial experts in BoardEx (see Section 4.2). 
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Table 6 presents the results of additional analyses. In Panel A, we examine investment efficiency 
as consequences. For indicator dependent variable in column (1), the coefficient on temporary investment 
committee is -0.319 with marginal effects of -0.079, indicating that firms with a temporary investment 
committee are 7.9 percent less likely to invest inefficiently. This is stronger than the marginal effect of 6.7 
percent for Temporary Finance Committee in Table 4, Panel C. For change variable in column (5), 
Permanent Investment Committee shows significantly negative coefficient unlike in Table 4. These results 
support our prediction that investment committees are more directly associated with investment 
performance than finance committees. In column (2), Finance Committee Adopt Year has a positive 
coefficient (0.275), which contradicts our expectation. In column (6), Finance Committee Adopt Year 
shows negative coefficient (-1.356), suggesting that decrease in investment inefficiency might be more 
concentrated in the first year. Although we find some evidence supporting for stronger impacts of 
investment committees and adopting years, the results are not consistent across models.20 
None of the coefficients on Large Finance Committee, Small Finance Committee, Strong Finance 
Committee, and Weak Finance Committee is significant, suggesting that committee size and composition 
are not as important in determining the impact of finance committees.  
The results of additional analyses on capex guidance are presented in Panel B. We show only 
forecast errors (level and change) as a dependent variable. Temporary Investment Committee show 
significantly negative coefficients unlike Temporary Finance Committee in Table 5, suggesting that 
investment committees might be more highly related to investment performance than finance committees. 
All other variables are not significant except for Strong Finance Committee in column (8). Overall, only 
the prediction on investment committees is somewhat supported by our empirical results, and committee 
size and composition do not seem to provide different impacts. 
 
                                                          
20 We run the same model using the continuous investment inefficiency variable as the dependent variable but none of the 
coefficients on the variables of interest are statistically significant (not-tabulated). 
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8. Conclusion 
 We examined the determinants and consequences of finance committee use. Proxy statements 
suggest that finance committees are created deliberately with a goal of overseeing and advising 
management on financial issues. We predicted that complex firms with intense finance-related work are 
more likely to have a finance committee. Consistent with our prediction, we find that use of derivative 
and defined benefit pension plans, high leverage and credit rating, and active dividend payout are 
positively associated with the existence of a finance committee.   
 Next, we investigated whether companies benefit from having a finance committee. We argued 
that bringing together a group of financial experts in a finance committee will guide management better 
and ultimately improve financial performance. We examined the impact of having a finance committee on 
investment efficiency and quality of capex guidance. We showed that firms with a temporary finance 
committee invest more efficiently and provide more frequent capex guidance. The empirical results do 
not show significant association between the use of finance committees and capex forecast accuracy and 
precision. We infer from the limited evidence that finance committees improve investment decisions but 
not by much.  
 We expect this study to advance our understanding of board dynamics. The active use of finance 
committees by firms in great need of finance expertise suggests that boards are not simply a static 
governance form. Rather, we provide evidence that boards evolve to respond to new environments and to 
perform their monitoring and advisory roles.  
 We restrict our sample to unregulated industries in this study. Given the high proportion of 
finance committees and existing requirement for a risk committee in financial industry, separate study of 
finance committee use in regulated industries will add to our understanding of boards. We leave this to 
future research.
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Appendix A 
GE’s 2017 & 2018 proxy statements 
 
Panel A. Excerpts from GE’s 2017 proxy statement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This panel shows a part of GE’s proxy statement in 2017, the year before GE created the finance committee. 
We selected only the parts that are related to the finance committee and reorganized figures. 
Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000120677417000738/ge_courtesy-pdf.pdf (p.21) 
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Panel B. Excerpts from GE’s 2018 proxy statement 
 
(Source: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/40545/000120677418000752/ge_courtesy-pdf.pdf). 
Note: Above panel shows experts from GE’s 2018 proxy statement (p.3, 4, 17). We selected only the parts that are 
related to the finance committee and reorganized figures. Below table shows how each directors’ financial expertise 
is coded in our sample. 
Director Name MBA Accounting expert Finance expert Finance or Accounting Expert 
Jim Mulva 1 0 1 1 
Ed Garden 0 0 1 1 
Jim Rohr 1 0 0 1 
Jim Tisch 1 0 0 1 
Larry Culp Jr 1 0 0 1 
Leslie Seidman 0 1 0 1 
Sébastien Bazin 0 0 0 0 
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Appendix B 
Examples of key responsibilities of finance committees 
 
 
FOSSIL GROUP (2009) 
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/883569/000104746909004056/a2192221zdef14a.htm) 
 
The Board of Directors (the “Board”) has established a Finance Committee (the “Committee”) for the purpose of 
overseeing all areas of corporate finance for Fossil Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries (the “Company”), including: 
  
• capital structure;  
• equity and debt financings;  
• capital expenditures; cash management;  
• banking activities and relationships; investments;  
• foreign exchange activities; and  
• share repurchase activities. 
 
 
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC (2014) 
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732712/000119312514102273/d633245ddef14a.htm) 
In 2013, Verizon agreed to purchase the remaining interest in Verizon Wireless that it did not already 
own. Because the Company was going to incur significant additional debt in order to complete this 
acquisition, the Board determined that it should increase its oversight of the Company’s cash flows and 
liquidity through the creation of a Finance Committee of Directors with significant financial expertise. 
Summary of Key Responsibilities: 
• Review Verizon’s capital management policies, plans and activities; 
• Monitor Verizon’s capital needs and financing arrangements and ability to access the capital 
markets; 
• Monitor expenditures under the annual capital plan approved by the Board; 
• Review Verizon’s policies and strategies for managing currency and interest rate exposure and 
the use of derivatives; 
• Review and approve Verizon’s policies regarding the usage of the end user exception from the 
mandatory clearing and exchange trading requirements for certain swaps under the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act; 
• Review Verizon’s insurance and self-insurance programs; and 
• Review Verizon’s policies, strategy and performance with respect to the investment of pension assets 
and the funding of pension and other postretirement benefit obligations. 
 
COCA COLA CO (2005) 
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/21344/000104746905005630/a2151220zdef14a.htm) 
Under the terms of its charter, the Finance Committee is appointed to assist the Board in discharging its 
responsibilities relating to oversight of the Company's financial affairs. In fulfilling its duties, the Finance 
Committee, among other things, shall: 
• formulate and recommend for approval to the Board of Directors the financial policies of the Company;  
• maintain oversight of the budget and financial operations of the Company;  
• review and recommend capital expenditures;  
• evaluate the performance of and returns on approved capital expenditures; and  
• recommend dividend policy to the Board. 
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HOME DEPOT INC (2013) 
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/354950/000119312513145982/d451582ddef14a.htm) 
In February 2012, the Board approved the creation of a Finance Committee and dissolution of the Infrastructure 
Committee, effective May 1, 2012. The functions of the Finance Committee will include overseeing the 
management of the Company’s capital structure, financial resources and related financial risks to effectively 
support the Company’s long-range strategic and operational objectives while maintaining a sound financial 
condition. Committee functions: 
 
• Oversees the management of the Company’s capital structure, financial resources and related financial 
risks to effectively support the Company’s long-range strategic and operational objectives while 
maintaining the Company’s sound financial condition 
• Reviews and recommends policies, practices and strategies concerning financial matters, including the 
Company’s management of financial risk, capital structure, investments and insurance 
• Oversees the Company’s annual capital plan, significant capital investments and strategies with respect 
to mergers and acquisitions activity 
 
 
TIFFANY & CO. (2009)  
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98246/000095012309006323/y75709def14a.htm) 
In May 2008, the Board formed the Finance Committee to assist the Board with its oversight of the Company’s 
capital structure, dividend policy, repurchase of the Company’s capital stock, debt and equity financings, and the 
retention of investment bankers and other financial advisors to the Board. The Finance Committee operates under 
the charter adopted by the Board. The charter may be viewed on the Company’s 
website, http://investor.tiffany.com/governance.cfm. 
 
 
LYONDELLBASELL INDUSTRIES NV (2017) 
(https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1489393/000119312517113698/d350517ddef14a.htm) 
It is the duty of the Finance Committee to assist the Supervisory Board in its oversight responsibilities by 
monitoring and assessing such matters as the Company’s capital structure and allocation, debt portfolio, and 
derivative strategies. In fulfilling its duties, the Finance Committee has the following responsibilities: 
• Strategy – Review analyses and provide guidance and advice regarding acquisitions and divestments and 
discuss and review the Company’s tax strategies, planning and related structures; 
• Capital – Review the Company’s capital structure; review capital allocation, including organic or 
inorganic investments, review and discuss the dividend policy; review and discuss stock repurchase 
activities and plans; and 
• Securities and Financing – Review and discuss the Company’s debt portfolio, credit facilities, 
compliance with financial covenants; review and discuss the commodity, interest rate or currency 
derivative strategies; review and discuss the securities offerings. 
  
 
Note:  This appendix shows main duties of finance committees from several proxy statements of different firms.   
We develop our hypotheses on finance committee determinants mainly based on proxy statements. Therefore, we 
highlight keywords that support each hypothesis using different font colors: 
H1 (Financial complexity); H2 (Debt financing); H3 (Payout policy); H4 (Investments).
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Appendix C 
Variable definitions 
 
Variables for finance committee determinants analyses 
Variable name Variable definitions [source] 
Finance Committee An indicator variable that equals one if the board of directors has a finance 
committee and zero otherwise. [BoardEx] 
Permanent Finance Committee An indicator variable that equals one if the finance committee lasts for over 
80 percent of the time from the adoption year to the end of sample period and 
zero otherwise. [BoardEx] 
Temporary Finance Committee An indicator variable that equals one if the finance committee lasts for less 
than 80 percent of the time from the adoption year to the end of sample 
period and zero otherwise. [BoardEx] 
Derivative User An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports non-missing or nonzero 
unrealized derivative gain or loss.  
[Compustat items AOCIDERGL, CIDERGL] 
Foreign An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm reports non-missing or nonzero 
foreign exchange income and zero otherwise. [Compustat data FCA] 
DBplan User An indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports non-missing or 
nonzero projected benefit obligation. [Compustat items PBPRO, PBPRU] 
Deferred Tax Deferred tax rate scaled by total assets. [Compustat items TXDI/AT] 
Leverage Ratio of total debt to equity.  
[Compustat items (DLC +data DLTT)/(data PRCC_F*dataCHSO)] 
Ratings Long-term issuer credit ratings compiled by Standard & Poor's and reported 
on Compustat [Compustat item SPLTICRM]. 
Debt Financing Net debt financing measured as the cash proceeds from the issuance of long-
term debt less cash payments for long-term debt reductions less the net 
changes in current debt, deflated by total assets. 
[Compustat items (DLTIS-DLTR-DLCCH)/AT] 
Div Payer An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has nonzero dividends. 
[Compustat DVC]  
Repurchase An indicator variable that equals one if the increase in common treasury 
stock (Compustat item TSTKC) is not zero or missing. If treasury stock is 
zero, we measure repurchases as the difference between stock purchases 
(Compustat item PRSTKC) and stock issuances (Compustat item SSTK) 
from the statement of cash flows. If either of these amounts is negative or 
missing, repurchases are set to zero. [Compustat] 
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditure to total assets. [Compustat items CAPX/AT] 
R&D Ratio of research and development (R&D) expenditure to total assets. R&D 
expenditure is set to zero if missing. [Compustat items XRD/AT] 
Acquisition An indicator variable that equals one if the firm reports non-missing or 
nonzero acquisition expenditure. [Compustat item AQC] 
Divestiture An indicator variable that equals one if a company reports discontinued 
operations and zero otherwise. [Compustat item DO] 
Restructure An indicator variable that equals to 1 if at least one of Compustat annual data 
items RCP, RCA, RCEPS, or RCD is not equal to 0. [Compustat] 
Board Size Total number of directors on the board. [BoardEx] 
Board Independence Percentage of non-executive directors on the board. [BoardEx] 
LogMVE Log of market value where market value is fiscal year-end stock price times 
the number of shares outstanding. [Compustat items PRCC_F*CSHO] 
ROA Ratio of operating income before depreciation to total assets.  
[Compustat items OIBDP/AT] 
Firm Age Number of years since the company was listed in a stock exchange. [CRSP] 
38 
 
Ret Volatility Return volatility, defined as the standard deviation of monthly stock returns 
in the fiscal year. [CRSP data RET] 
InstOwn Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. [Thompson 
Reuters] 
CEO (CFO) with MBA An indicator that equals one if the CEO (CFO) has an MBA degree and zero 
otherwise. [BoardEx] 
Accounting expert CEO (CFO) An indicator that equals one if the CEO (CFO) has accounting expertise and 
zero otherwise. We search for "CPA," "accounting," "accountant," 
"accountancy," "audit," "controller," "internal control," "financial report." in 
education, qualification, and prior employment history of directors to identify 
accounting expertise. [BoardEx] 
Finance expert CEO (CFO) An indicator that equals one if the CEO (CFO) has finance expertise and zero 
otherwise. We search for "finance," "invest," "asset," "capital," "credit," 
"budget," "bank," "treasur" in education, qualification, and prior employment 
history of directors to identify finance expertise. [BoardEx] 
 
Variables for finance committee consequences analyses 
Variable name Variable definitions [source] 
Investment Inefficiency 
(Continuous variable) 
Absolute value of the residual from a regression of a firm's total investment on 
sales growth. The regressions are estimated by industry and year for industry-
year with at least 30 available observations. Total investment is the sum of 
R&D expenditure (Compustat item XRD), capital expenditure (Compustat item 
CAPX), and acquisition expenditure (Compustat item AQC) less cash receipts 
from sale of property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item SPPE) multiplied 
by 100 and scaled by total assets. Sales growth is the percentage change in 
sales (Compustat item SALE) from year t-1 to 1. [Compustat] 
Investment Inefficiency 
(Indicator variable) 
An indicator variable that equals one if a firm has Investment Inefficiency 
above the median and zero otherwise. [Compustat] 
Ncommittees Total number of committees of the board. [BoardEx] 
LogAT Log of total assets. [Compustat data AT] 
Analayst Following Number of analysts following the firm. [IBES] 
MtoB Ratio of the market value of total assets to book value of total assets. 
[Compustat items (AT+PRCC_F*CSHO-CEQ-XTDB)/AT] 
OCF Volatility Standard deviation of cash flow from operations deflated by total assets from 
years t-5 to t-1. [Compustat item OANCF] 
Sales Volatility Standard deviation of sales deflated by total assets from years t-5 to t-1. 
[Compustat data SALE] 
Invest Volatility Standard deviation of total investment from years t-5 to t-1. [Compustat] 
Tangible Ratio of PP&E to total assets. [Compustat PPENT/AT] 
K-structure Ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and the market value of 
equity. [Compustat items DLTT/(DLTT+PRCC_F*CSHO)) 
OCF to Sale Ratio of cash flow from operating activities to sales. [Compustat items 
OANCF/AT] 
Financial Slack Ratio of cash to PPE. [Compustat items CHE/ PPENT] 
OprCycle Log of receivables to sales (Compustat items RECT/SALE) plus inventory to 
COGS (Compustat items INVT/COGS) multiplied by 360. [Compustat] 
Loss Indicator variable that equals one if net income before extraordinary items is 
negative, and zero otherwise. [Compustat item IB] 
Capex Issuance Indicator variable that equals one if a firm provides at least one annual capex 
guidance for fiscal year t. [I/B/E/S] 
Nforecast Number of annual capex guidance for fiscal year t. [I/B/E/S] 
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Capex Forecast Error Average forecast error of all annual capex guidance issued for fiscal year t. For 
each forecast, forecast error is measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between the management forecasted capex minus the actual capex divided by 
net PP&E. For range forecasts, we use the mid-point of a range estimate. 
[I/B/E/S] 
Capex Forecast Range Average range of all annual capex guidance issued for year t. For each forecast, 
forecast range is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the 
upper and lower bound of capex guidance divided by net PP&E. For a point 
forecast, the upper and lower bounds of the forecast range will be equal. 
[I/B/E/S] 
Analyst Dispersion Analyst earnings forecast dispersion. [I/B/E/S] 
TobinQ Ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets.  
[Compustat items (AT-CEQ+PRCC_F*CSHO]/AT] 
40 
 
Figure 1 
Frequency distribution of finance committees by industry 
 
 
 
Note: This figure shows a frequency distribution of finance committees by industry. X-axis presents industries 
classified by Fama and French 12 industry classification and y-axis is percentage of firms. Financial and utilities 
industries are labeled as regulated industry and the rest is grouped as unregulated industry in figures 1 through 3. 
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Figure 2  
Titles of finance committees 
 
Panel A. Frequency distribution of finance committee titles for unregulated industries 
        
Panel B. Frequency distribution of finance committee titles for regulated industries 
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Top 10 Titles of Finance Committees 
Finance Committee Names Frequency 
Finance 3368 
Investments 362 
Mergers and Acquisitions 190 
Pensions 168 
Executive and Finance 118 
Risk 113 
Acquisitions 112 
Finance and Investment 78 
Finance and Pension 66 
Finance and Strategic Planning 66 
Top 10 Titles of Finance Committees 
Finance Committee Names Frequency 
Finance 956 
Investments 848 
Risk 583 
Risk Management 242 
Loans 224 
Finance and Risk 150 
Finance and Investment 149 
Enterprise Risk Management 133 
Risk Oversight 95 
Assets and Liabilities Management 88 
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Figure 3. Distributions of permanent and temporary finance committees by year 
Panel A. Trend of finance committee use for unregulated industries 
           
Panel B. Trend of finance committee use for regulated industries 
            
Note: In both Panels A and B, y-axis is equal-weighted (market-value weighted) proportion of firms with finance committees in the left (right) graph.
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Table 1. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics of Finance Committees 
Panel A. Sample selection   
Firm-year observations in BoardEx with complete data about committees (2003-2017) 82,775 
           (Less) Firm-years that do not link to Compustat (e.g., missing CIK) (14,771) 
           (Less) Firm-years lacking industry code (SIC) (2,381) 
 65,571 
           (Less) Firm-years for financials and utilities (16,643) 
           (Less) Firm-years with insufficient data to construct control variables (11,026) 
Final sample for analysis of the determinants 37,902 
 
Panel B. Change in board composition in adoption years   
 (1) (2) (1) vs. (2) 
 
Non-adoption 
years 
Adoption 
years  
  Mean Mean t-stat 
Change in board size 0.008 0.111 (1.51) 
% Change in board size  0.008 0.029 (2.36)* 
Change in number of finance experts 0.055 0.185 (3.53)** 
% Change in number of finance experts 0.045 0.118 (2.64)* 
Change in number of accounting experts 0.079 0.208 (3.34)* 
% Change in the number of accounting experts  0.067 0.154 (3.27)* 
Change in number of supervisory experts 0.062 0.664 (8.09)*** 
% Change in the number of supervisory experts  0.034 0.197 (7.35)*** 
Change in number of experts 0.087 0.747 (8.26)*** 
% Change in the number of experts 0.035 0.201 (6.75)*** 
N 7,039 337 7,376 
This panel reports average changes in board size and composition for firms that ever adopted a finance committee. Non-adoption 
years include both pre- and post-adoption years. 
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Panel C. Comparison of audit committee and finance committee for firms with both 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) vs. (2) (1) vs. (3) (1) vs. (4) 
 
Finance 
Committee 
Audit 
Committee 
Compensation 
Committee 
Nominating / 
Governance 
Committee    
N=4,864 mean mean mean mean t-stat t-stat t-stat 
Committee size (Number of directors) 4.596 4.484 4.406 4.528 (5.33)*** (8.16)*** (3.38)*** 
Committee size (ratio)a 0.478 0.472 0.466 0.475 (2.71)*** (5.27)*** (1.48) 
Percentage of accounting expertsb 0.271 0.358 0.178 0.168 (-24.59)*** (24.13)*** (26.99)*** 
Percentage of finance expertsb 0.246 0.266 0.172 0.164 (-6.26)*** (19.79)*** (22.56)*** 
Percentage of supervisory expertsb 0.807 0.793 0.827 0.818 (4.58)*** (-5.58)*** (-2.50)** 
Percentage of expertsb 0.894 0.905 0.887 0.872 (-4.37)*** (2.12)** (8.03)*** 
Whether chair is an expert 0.762 0.908 0.838 0.791 (-20.51)*** (-10.11)*** (-3.09)*** 
Allocation of accounting experts (ratio)c 0.564 0.757 0.359 0.362 (-26.03)*** (24.34)*** (23.01)*** 
Allocation of finance experts (ratio)c 0.570 0.610 0.385 0.382 (-4.71)*** (19.82)*** (20.11)*** 
Allocation of supervisory experts (ratio)c 0.483 0.472 0.485 0.486 (5.81)*** (1.53) (1.03) 
Allocation of experts (ratio)c 0.491 0.498 0.477 0.476 (-2.22)** (4.27)*** (4.09)*** 
a 
Number of directors in each committee divided by total number of directors on the board 
b 
Number of experts in each committee divided by total number of directors in the committee 
c 
Number of experts in each committee divided by total number of experts on the board
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Table 2 
Tests of differences in potential determinants of having a finance committee among the firms with and without finance committees 
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  None Temporary Permanent 
None vs. 
Temporary 
None vs. 
Permanent 
Temporary vs. 
Permanent 
    Mean Mean Mean t-stat t-stat t-stat 
H1. Financial 
complexity 
Derivative User 0.350 0.514 0.606 (9.32)*** (31.33)*** (4.86)*** 
Foreign 0.323 0.348 0.348 (1.48) (3.14)** (0.01) 
DBplan User 0.321 0.484 0.684 (9.23)*** (46.37)*** (10.59)*** 
Deferred Tax 
-0.001 -0.000 0.000 (0.95) (4.23)*** (0.71) 
H2. Debt financing 
Leverage 0.398 0.419 0.534 (0.67) (8.45)*** (3.25)** 
Ratings 0.763 1.503 2.373 (11.04)*** (49.63)*** (11.83)*** 
Missing Ratings 0.758 0.568 0.357 (-10.92)*** (-50.47)*** (-11.24)*** 
Debt Financing 0.013 0.011 0.014 (-0.40) (0.55) (0.57) 
H3. Payout 
Div Payer 0.288 0.443 0.605 (8.87)*** (38.89)*** (8.56)*** 
Repurchase 0.243 0.307 0.367 (3.98)*** (15.54)*** (3.37)*** 
H4. Investments 
CAPEX 0.049 0.048 0.049 (-0.53) (0.37) (0.66) 
R&D 0.072 0.052 0.027 (-4.35)*** (-30.40)*** (-5.17)*** 
Acquisition 0.393 0.509 0.556 (6.61)*** (19.61)*** (2.46)* 
Divestiture 0.143 0.224 0.248 (5.49)*** (14.66)*** (1.49) 
Restructure 0.292 0.394 0.460 (5.94)*** (20.27)*** (3.53)*** 
Board characteristics 
Board Size 7.785 8.868 9.899 (14.57)*** (57.75)*** (12.66)*** 
Board Independence 80.523 83.980 86.159 (11.97)*** (49.11)*** (7.22)*** 
Firm characteristics 
LogMVE 6.089 6.694 7.839 (8.87)*** (52.00)*** (15.35)*** 
ROA 0.023 0.077 0.110 (6.64)*** (27.42)*** (4.03)*** 
Firm Age 15.940 23.314 30.029 (10.96)*** (38.10)*** (8.84)*** 
Ret Volatility 0.135 0.121 0.103 (-5.80)*** (-29.34)*** (-7.17)*** 
InstOwn 0.482 0.509 0.597 (2.07)* (19.32)*** (6.37)*** 
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 N 33,106 827 3,969 33,933 37,075 4,796 
CEOs' and CFOs' 
background 
CEO with MBA 0.334 0.354 0.494 (0.79) (14.74)*** (5.31)*** 
Accounting expert CEO 0.105 0.116 0.092 (0.67) (-2.10)* (-1.40) 
Finance expert CEO 0.132 0.124 0.158 (-0.50) (3.21)** (1.84) 
CFO with MBA 0.439 0.509 0.480 (2.74)** (3.79)*** (-1.06) 
Accounting expert CFO 0.729 0.718 0.691 (-0.45) (-3.80)*** (-1.12) 
Finance expert CFO 0.694 0.566 0.691 (-5.01)*** (-0.29) (4.63)*** 
  N 16,383 387 2,415 16,770 18,798 2,802 
This table reports average values of each variable for different groups, and differences among the pairs. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, 
in two-tailed tests. All variables are defined in Appendix C.
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Table 3 
Analysis on the determinants of having a finance committee  
Panel A. Binary logit model   
 
  
Dep.var=1 if a firm has a finance committee,  
and 0 if a firm does not have a finance committee 
Dep.var=1 if a firm has a permanent finance committee, 
and 0 if a firm has a temporary finance committee  
    
Pr. 
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  VARIABLES Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
 
                    
H1. Financial 
complexity 
Derivative User + 0.144* 0.013* 0.136 0.014 -0.078 -0.009 -0.056 -0.005 
  (1.67) (1.67) (1.28) (1.28) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.22) (-0.22) 
Foreign + -0.179* -0.016* -0.206* -0.021* -0.265 -0.031 -0.317 -0.029 
  (-1.89) (-1.89) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.29) (-1.29) 
DBplan User + 0.317*** 0.029*** 0.269** 0.027** 0.568** 0.067** 0.440 0.041 
  (2.93) (2.92) (2.05) (2.06) (2.20) (2.21) (1.36) (1.36) 
Deferred Tax + 1.176 0.108 -0.511 -0.052 3.814 0.451 4.506 0.415 
    (1.24) (1.24) (-0.42) (-0.42) (1.60) (1.60) (1.33) (1.32) 
H2. Debt 
financing 
Leverage + 0.064 0.006 0.116** 0.012** 0.135 0.016 0.284* 0.026* 
  (1.57) (1.58) (2.33) (2.33) (1.39) (1.38) (1.85) (1.83) 
Ratings + -0.047 -0.004 -0.040 -0.004 0.056 0.007 -0.033 -0.003 
  (-0.66) (-0.66) (-0.48) (-0.48) (0.37) (0.37) (-0.17) (-0.17) 
Missing Ratings - -0.566** -0.052** -0.445 -0.045 0.011 0.001 -0.191 -0.018 
  (-2.43) (-2.42) (-1.62) (-1.62) (0.02) (0.02) (-0.27) (-0.27) 
Debt Financing + -0.054 -0.005 -0.315* -0.032* 0.024 0.003 0.831 0.077 
    (-0.39) (-0.39) (-1.83) (-1.83) (0.06) (0.06) (1.19) (1.18) 
H3. Payout 
Div Payer + 0.241** 0.022** 0.320*** 0.033*** -0.003 -0.000 -0.204 -0.019 
  (2.45) (2.44) (2.72) (2.72) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.66) (-0.65) 
Repurchase + 0.005 0.000 -0.071 -0.007 -0.048 -0.006 -0.157 -0.014 
    (0.07) (0.07) (-0.74) (-0.74) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.77) (-0.77) 
H4. 
Investments 
CAPEX + 1.031 0.095 1.318 0.134 2.778 0.328 3.977* 0.366* 
  (1.29) (1.29) (1.30) (1.31) (1.49) (1.50) (1.67) (1.67) 
R&D + -0.753 -0.069 -0.779 -0.079 -1.885* -0.223* -2.950* -0.272* 
  (-1.07) (-1.07) (-0.94) (-0.94) (-1.66) (-1.67) (-1.89) (-1.89) 
Acquisition + 0.106 0.010 0.110 0.011 -0.148 -0.018 -0.121 -0.011 
  (1.56) (1.55) (1.32) (1.32) (-0.98) (-0.98) (-0.60) (-0.60) 
Divestiture + 0.088 0.008 0.056 0.006 0.003 0.000 -0.171 -0.016 
  (1.06) (1.06) (0.55) (0.55) (0.02) (0.02) (-0.77) (-0.77) 
Restructure + 0.008 0.001 -0.051 -0.005 -0.224 -0.026 0.005 0.000 
    (0.12) (0.12) (-0.60) (-0.60) (-1.36) (-1.36) (0.02) (0.02) 
Board Size + 0.170*** 0.016*** 0.183*** 0.019*** 0.078 0.009 0.061 0.006 
  (7.35) (7.32) (6.36) (6.41) (1.42) (1.42) (0.86) (0.87) 
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Board 
characteristics 
Board Independence + 0.040*** 0.004*** 0.042*** 0.004*** 0.008 0.001 0.029* 0.003* 
    (6.56) (6.59) (5.58) (5.61) (0.60) (0.60) (1.86) (1.88) 
Firm 
characteristics 
LogMVE + 0.098** 0.009** 0.123*** 0.012*** 0.161** 0.019** 0.278** 0.026** 
  (2.40) (2.41) (2.67) (2.67) (2.00) (1.98) (2.55) (2.54) 
ROA + -0.333 -0.031 -0.480* -0.049* -1.097** -0.130** -2.423*** -0.223*** 
  (-1.50) (-1.50) (-1.65) (-1.66) (-2.08) (-2.08) (-2.63) (-2.63) 
Firm Age + 0.016*** 0.002*** 0.012*** 0.001*** 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 
  (5.60) (5.63) (3.62) (3.63) (0.47) (0.47) (0.30) (0.30) 
Ret Volatility + -0.118 -0.011 -0.055 -0.006 1.164 0.138 0.904 0.083 
  (-0.25) (-0.25) (-0.09) (-0.09) (1.02) (1.02) (0.54) (0.53) 
InstOwn ? -0.194 -0.018 -0.092 -0.009 0.461 0.054 1.042*** 0.096*** 
    (-1.39) (-1.39) (-0.55) (-0.55) (1.50) (1.51) (2.82) (2.84) 
CEOs' and 
CFOs' 
background 
CEO with MBA ?   0.437*** 0.045***   0.593** 0.055** 
    (4.24) (4.24)   (2.48) (2.47) 
Accounting expert 
CEO 
?   -0.313* -0.032*   -0.652* -0.060* 
    (-1.78) (-1.78)   (-1.66) (-1.65) 
Finance expert CEO ?   0.081 0.008   0.377 0.035 
    (0.50) (0.50)   (1.07) (1.08) 
CFO with MBA ?   -0.023 -0.002   -0.293 -0.027 
    (-0.23) (-0.23)   (-1.22) (-1.21) 
Accounting expert 
CFO 
?   0.121 0.012   -0.144 -0.013 
    (1.15) (1.15)   (-0.58) (-0.57) 
Finance expert CFO ?   -0.082 -0.008   0.473** 0.044** 
        (-0.80) (-0.80)   (2.04) (2.06) 
 Constant  -7.672***  -8.255***  -2.412*  -4.952***  
 
  (-12.67)  (-11.00)  (-1.82)  (-3.06)  
 
              
 Observations  37,902 37,902 19,185 19,185 4,796 4,796 2,802 2,802 
 Pseudo R2  0.181   0.190   0.182   0.247 
 
  
Fixed Effects 
  
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
This panel reports logit regression estimates of equation (2). The numbers in parentheses are robust z-statistics and standard errors are clustered by firm. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, in two-tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are classified using Fama and French 12 
sectors. All other variables are defined in Appendix C.  
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Panel B. Multinomial logit model (Base group: firms with no finance committees) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  VARIABLES Temporary Permanent Temporary Permanent 
 
          
H1. Financial 
complexity 
Derivative User 0.022 0.156 -0.006 0.146 
 (0.15) (1.56) (-0.03) (1.22) 
Foreign 0.000 -0.214* 0.009 -0.239* 
 (0.00) (-1.93) (0.04) (-1.95) 
DBplan User -0.115 0.426*** -0.213 0.365** 
 (-0.62) (3.39) (-0.91) (2.45) 
Deferred Tax -1.085 1.773* -3.741 0.191 
  (-0.53) (1.74) (-1.47) (0.14) 
H2. Debt financing 
Leverage -0.043 0.092** -0.090 0.153*** 
 (-0.56) (2.00) (-0.75) (2.81) 
Ratings -0.118 -0.043 0.026 -0.060 
 (-0.91) (-0.53) (0.16) (-0.66) 
Missing Ratings -0.699* -0.559** -0.248 -0.497 
 (-1.73) (-2.12) (-0.47) (-1.64) 
Debt Financing 0.085 -0.095 -0.215 -0.347* 
 (0.27) (-0.64) (-0.99) (-1.93) 
H3. Payout 
Div Payer 0.280 0.235** 0.552** 0.283** 
 (1.54) (2.10) (2.47) (2.15) 
Repurchase 0.103 -0.017 0.006 -0.082 
  (0.73) (-0.19) (0.03) (-0.76) 
H4. Investments 
CAPEX -0.708 1.531 -1.121 1.870 
 (-0.52) (1.63) (-0.65) (1.60) 
R&D 0.516 -1.324 0.563 -1.143 
 (0.60) (-1.38) (0.50) (-1.10) 
Acquisition 0.219* 0.082 0.232 0.098 
 (1.78) (1.06) (1.45) (1.06) 
Divestiture 0.080 0.096 0.075 0.058 
 (0.54) (1.03) (0.40) (0.52) 
Restructure 0.143 -0.025 -0.062 -0.052 
 (1.05) (-0.32) (-0.34) (-0.55) 
Board characteristics 
Board Size 0.122*** 0.180*** 0.151*** 0.187*** 
 (3.13) (6.76) (2.88) (5.81) 
Board Independence 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.029** 0.046*** 
  (3.87) (5.67) (2.09) (5.43) 
Firm characteristics 
LogMVE -0.025 0.134*** -0.075 0.171*** 
 (-0.40) (2.75) (-0.89) (3.25) 
ROA 0.221 -0.522** 0.652 -0.767** 
 (0.61) (-1.98) (1.13) (-2.42) 
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Firm Age 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.013** 0.012*** 
 (3.33) (5.00) (2.21) (3.27) 
Ret Volatility -0.835 0.062 0.043 -0.069 
 (-1.07) (0.11) (0.04) (-0.09) 
InstOwn -0.485* -0.084 -0.806*** 0.105 
 (-1.94) (-0.51) (-2.67) (0.54) 
CEOs' and CFOs' 
background 
CEO with MBA     -0.008 0.519*** 
    (-0.04) (4.51) 
Accounting Expert CEO    0.158 -0.401** 
    (0.59) (-1.98) 
Finance Expert CEO    -0.116 0.103 
    (-0.46) (0.57) 
CFO with MBA    0.271 -0.079 
    (1.40) (-0.72) 
Accounting Expert CFO    0.235 0.105 
    (1.09) (0.92) 
Finance Expert CFO    -0.446** -0.007 
      (-2.39) (-0.06) 
 Constant -6.829*** -8.689*** -6.282*** -9.483*** 
  (-7.21) (-12.15) (-4.64) (-11.38) 
       
 Observations 37,902 37,902 19,185 19,185 
 Pseudo R2 0.181 0.181 0.197 0.197 
  Fixed Effects Year & Industry Year & Industry Year & Industry Year & Industry 
This panel reports multinomial logit regression estimates of equation (2). The numbers in parentheses are robust z-statistics and standard errors 
are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, in two-tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are 
classified using Fama and French 12 sectors. All other variables are defined in Appendix C.  
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Table 4 
Analysis of finance committee and investment efficiency 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for variables in our regression analyses of investment efficiency (N=5,773)   
 Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
Permanent Finance Committee 0.412 0.492 0 0 1 
Temporary Finance Committee 0.082 0.274 0 0 0 
NCommittees 4.266 1.085 4.000 4.000 5.000 
Board Size 9.713 2.212 8.000 10.000 11.000 
LogAsset 7.723 1.966 6.555 7.876 9.134 
Analyst Following 9.216 8.396 1.000 7.000 15.000 
InstOwn 0.641 0.332 0.480 0.750 0.886 
MtoB 1.825 1.165 1.168 1.498 2.080 
OCF Volatility 0.052 0.092 0.020 0.033 0.056 
Sales Volatility 0.148 0.151 0.056 0.102 0.183 
Invest Volatility 5.564 6.076 1.905 3.769 7.166 
Tangible 0.289 0.235 0.103 0.216 0.436 
K-structure 0.209 0.200 0.051 0.159 0.298 
OCF to Sale -0.042 2.439 0.047 0.100 0.173 
Financial Slack 2.342 10.270 0.103 0.386 1.350 
div_payer 0.596 0.491 0.000 1.000 1.000 
FirmAge 29.249 21.607 13.000 23.000 41.000 
OprCycle 4.527 0.747 4.136 4.616 4.996 
Loss 0.204 0.403 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Panel B. Test of differences in investment efficiency 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  None Temporary Permanent 
None vs. 
Temporary 
None vs. 
Permanent 
Temporary vs. 
Permanent 
 
 N Mean N Mean N Mean t-stat t-stat t-stat 
Investment 
inefficiency 
(Indicator) 
over- or under-investment  2,922  0.495 473  0.507 2,378  0.484 (0.49) (-0.81) (-0.93) 
over-investment  867  0.446 151  0.543 749  0.435 (2.20)* (-0.45) (-2.42)* 
under-investment 2,055  0.516 322  0.491 1,629  0.506 (-0.84) (-0.56) (0.52) 
Investment 
inefficiency 
(Continuous) 
over- or under-investment  2,922  6.663 473  7.493 2,378  6.460 (2.11)* (-1.08) (-2.60)** 
over-investment  867  6.971 151  9.288 749  7.303 (2.36)* (0.71) (-1.98)* 
under-investment  2,055  6.534 322  6.651 1,629  6.073 (0.35) (-2.69)** (-1.71) 
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Change in 
Investment 
inefficiency  
over- or under-investment  2,487  0.099 449  -0.085 1,995  -0.073 (-0.44) (-0.87) (0.03) 
over-investment  761  -0.876 148  -1.266 628  -0.740 (-0.36) (0.27) (0.48) 
under-investment  1,726  0.529 301  0.495 1,367  0.233 (-0.10) (-1.65) (-0.76) 
This table reports average values of investment inefficiency variables for different groups, and differences among the pairs. We use three types of investment inefficiency 
measures. Continuous measure is the absolute value of the residuals from a regression of a firm’s investment on sales growth. Indicator variable is equal to one if the absolute 
residual is above median. Change variable takes the difference in residuals of the current and following year. Observations with positive (negative) residuals are classified as 
overinvestment (underinvestment).  
 
 
Panel C. Effects of finance committees on investment efficiency 
  Over- or underinvestment Under-investment Over-investment 
  Pr. 
Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Indicator Continuous Change Indicator Continuous Change Indicator Continuous Change 
                      
Permanent  
Finance Committee 
- 0.117 0.200 -0.227 -0.035 -0.051 -0.213 0.103 0.839 -0.852 
 (1.20) (0.67) (-1.27) (-0.28) (-0.18) (-1.19) (0.71) (1.34) (-1.54) 
Temporary 
Finance Committee 
- -0.266* -0.365 -0.150 -0.420** -0.305 0.005 0.186 0.510 -2.255** 
  (-1.69) (-0.79) (-0.52) (-2.32) (-0.70) (0.02) (0.77) (0.57) (-2.41) 
NCommittees ? -0.080* -0.176 0.051 0.087 -0.071 -0.074 -0.157** -0.550** 0.412 
  (-1.77) (-1.43) (0.57) (1.53) (-0.56) (-0.91) (-2.25) (-2.26) (1.54) 
Board Size ? -0.011 0.035 0.035 -0.067** 0.009 0.052 -0.057* 0.054 -0.029 
  (-0.46) (0.54) (0.74) (-2.32) (0.13) (1.06) (-1.76) (0.38) (-0.22) 
Analyst Following - -0.008 -0.026 0.008 0.001 -0.025 0.002 -0.016* -0.011 0.013 
  (-1.27) (-1.45) (0.64) (0.07) (-1.40) (0.17) (-1.74) (-0.31) (0.33) 
InstOwn - -0.188 -0.549 -0.194 -0.387** -0.946** 0.273 -0.004 0.089 -1.221 
  (-1.40) (-1.12) (-0.66) (-2.31) (-2.39) (0.95) (-0.02) (0.08) (-1.39) 
MtoB + -0.069* 0.130 -0.153 -0.068 -0.178 0.213 0.089* 0.320 -0.517 
  (-1.88) (0.87) (-0.97) (-1.32) (-1.30) (1.62) (1.72) (1.15) (-1.64) 
OCF Volatility + 0.049 3.186 -1.289 0.651 -0.176 -1.718 -0.341 3.939 -0.568 
  (0.09) (0.88) (-0.52) (0.83) (-0.16) (-0.74) (-0.32) (0.46) (-0.11) 
Sales Volatility + 0.292 0.309 0.749 -0.282 1.501** -0.334 -0.252 -1.398 3.497 
  (1.13) (0.40) (0.97) (-0.92) (2.43) (-0.53) (-0.59) (-0.65) (1.48) 
Invest Volatility + 0.023*** 0.125*** -0.031 0.036*** 0.036 -0.001 0.055*** 0.243*** -0.070 
  (3.07) (3.95) (-1.39) (3.89) (1.57) (-0.03) (4.60) (3.08) (-1.00) 
Tangible - -1.784*** -3.688*** 0.047 -2.113*** -4.362*** 1.065*** -0.102 -2.642* -0.868 
  (-7.26) (-6.17) (0.12) (-7.75) (-6.90) (2.65) (-0.36) (-1.93) (-0.69) 
K-structure - 0.373 -1.079 -0.145 -0.219 0.407 -0.829* -0.778* -2.805* 0.647 
  (1.35) (-1.40) (-0.28) (-0.69) (0.61) (-1.78) (-1.88) (-1.67) (0.39) 
OCF to Sale - -0.019 -0.087 0.020 0.016 -0.024 0.079 -0.274*** -0.040 -0.075 
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  (-0.97) (-0.93) (0.14) (0.95) (-0.43) (1.62) (-2.72) (-0.30) (-0.31) 
FinancialSlack + -0.002 0.012 0.015 0.010 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.026 0.011 
  (-0.62) (0.73) (0.85) (1.19) (0.63) (1.27) (0.55) (0.47) (0.21) 
div_payer - 0.096 0.235 0.007 -0.236** 0.405 0.061 -0.082 0.634 -0.797 
  (0.99) (0.93) (0.04) (-2.09) (1.49) (0.32) (-0.63) (1.29) (-1.38) 
LogAsset - -0.054 -0.091 -0.053 0.033 0.140 -0.184** -0.013 -0.827*** 0.365 
  (-1.53) (-0.90) (-0.69) (0.75) (1.45) (-2.57) (-0.27) (-3.30) (1.48) 
FirmAge - 0.002 0.006 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.002 0.007 -0.005 
  (0.89) (1.05) (-1.20) (-0.19) (1.02) (-1.09) (0.64) (0.65) (-0.51) 
OprCycle + -0.071 0.032 0.019 0.083 0.644*** 0.004 -0.086 -0.961** -0.186 
  (-1.04) (0.15) (0.13) (1.02) (2.91) (0.03) (-1.04) (-2.41) (-0.43) 
Loss + 0.048 0.691** -0.149 0.158 -0.106 0.044 0.238 2.323*** -0.573 
  (0.51) (2.32) (-0.55) (1.50) (-0.44) (0.21) (1.47) (3.34) (-0.73) 
Constant  1.012** 6.002*** -0.114 0.642 0.706 2.750** 1.230** 18.238*** -5.027 
  (2.00) (3.76) (-0.10) (1.14) (0.44) (2.51) (2.06) (6.31) (-1.65) 
             
Observations  5,773 5,773 4,931 4,006 4,006 3,394 1,767 1,767 1,537 
Pseudo R2  0.125    0.0666    0.0664   
R-squared   0.220 0.013  0.381 0.031  0.211 0.043 
Adj-R2   0.215 0.00525  0.374 0.0196  0.193 0.0185 
Fixed Effects 
  
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
This panel reports logit and OLS regression estimates of equation (4). We estimate over- and under-investment combined in columns (1) through (3), only for under-
investment in columns (4) through (6), and only for over-investment in columns (7) through (9). Dependent variable in columns (1), (4), (7) is an indicator which equals one 
if absolute value of residual is above median. Dependent variable in columns (2), (5), (8) is absolute value of residual. Dependent variable in columns (3), (6), (8) is change 
in absolute value of residual. The numbers in parentheses are robust z-statistics and standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level respectively, in two-tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are classified using Fama and French 12 sectors. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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Table5 
Analysis of finance committee and capex guidance 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for variables in our regression analyses of capex guidance (N=4,394)  
  Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 
Permanent Finance Committee 0.455 0.498 0 0 1 
Temporary Finance Committee 0.049 0.215 0 0 0 
NCommittees 4.337 1.051 4.000 4.000 5.000 
Board Size 10.254 1.931 9.000 10.000 12.000 
Analyst Dispersion 0.046 0.061 0.010 0.030 0.050 
Leverage 0.468 0.858 0.113 0.238 0.459 
TobinQ 1.892 0.958 1.280 1.636 2.173 
ROA 0.142 0.075 0.099 0.135 0.178 
Loss 0.122 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LogAsset 8.391 1.422 7.401 8.359 9.465 
Ret Volatility 0.091 0.053 0.056 0.078 0.110 
Analyst Following 12.557 7.212 7.000 11.000 18.000 
InstOwn 0.730 0.290 0.674 0.815 0.908 
Tangible 0.266 0.210 0.102 0.202 0.380 
Invest Volatility 4.995 4.526 1.783 3.545 6.872 
 
 
Panel B. Test of differences in capex guidance quality 
             (1)               (2)             (3) (4) (5) (6) 
            None          Temporary        Permanent 
None vs. 
Temporary 
None vs. 
Permanent 
Temporary vs. 
Permanent 
  N    Mean N    Mean N    Mean     t-stat   t-stat     t-stat 
Capex Issuance 2,179 0.767 214 0.724 2,001 0.784 (-1.35) (1.30) (1.87) 
Capex Nforecast 1,733 3.630 157 3.834 1,577 3.770 (1.17) (1.86) (-0.36) 
Capex Forecast Error 1,734 0.046 158 0.044 1,578 0.045 (-0.27) (-0.26) (0.13) 
Capex Forecast Range 1,735 0.012 159 0.012 1,579 0.011 (0.00) (-0.76) (-0.31) 
Change in Nforecast 1,643 0.323 146 0.664 1,503 0.301 (1.98)* (-0.30) (-2.10)* 
Change in Forecast Error 1,394 0.003 111 0.000 1,292 0.000 (-0.55) (-1.36) (-0.05) 
Change in Forecast Range 1,442 0.000 121 0.001 1,336 0.000 (0.27) (-0.10) (-0.31) 
 
This panel reports average values of capex guidance quality and differences among the pairs. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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Panel C. Effects of finance committees on capex guidance quality     
  
Pr. Sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Capex 
Issuance 
Capex 
Nforecast 
Capex 
Forecast 
Error 
Capex 
Forecast 
Range ∆Nforecast 
∆Forecast 
Error 
∆Forecast 
Range 
                  
Permanent Finance Committee + -0.023 0.063 0.004 -0.000 0.016 -0.003 -0.000 
   (-0.13) (0.41) (0.67) (-0.35) (0.39) (-1.12) (-0.11) 
Temporary Finance Committee + 0.046 0.517** -0.009 -0.001 0.022 -0.005 -0.001 
    (0.18) (2.07) (-1.39) (-0.63) (0.26) (-1.20) (-1.44) 
NCommittees ? 0.033 0.014 -0.002 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.000 
  (0.40) (0.18) (-0.83) (0.86) (-0.55) (0.06) (1.46) 
Board Size ? 0.080** 0.008 -0.002* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (2.05) (0.23) (-1.75) (-0.05) (-0.05) (-0.60) (-0.21) 
ROA + 0.232 -1.491* -0.088*** -0.005 -0.154 0.036 0.009* 
  (0.23) (-1.68) (-2.60) (-0.61) (-0.31) (1.20) (1.68) 
Loss - 0.242 -0.313** 0.001 -0.002* -0.055 0.003 -0.001 
  (1.24) (-2.03) (0.12) (-1.75) (-0.57) (0.74) (-1.13) 
LogAsset + -0.181** 0.155** -0.008*** -0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-2.24) (2.02) (-3.14) (-5.17) (0.06) (-0.75) (-0.24) 
TobinQ + -0.144** -0.059 0.012*** 0.002* -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-1.99) (-0.74) (3.53) (1.95) (-0.04) (-0.47) (-0.76) 
Leverage + 0.068 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.057 0.000 0.000 
  (0.64) (-0.07) (-1.39) (-1.61) (1.63) (0.18) (0.14) 
Ret Volatility - -0.389 0.712 0.072* 0.003 -0.419 -0.047 -0.000 
  (-0.27) (0.67) (1.96) (0.27) (-0.71) (-1.46) (-0.01) 
Analyst Dispersion - 3.557*** -1.588** 0.070** 0.014** -0.069 0.008 -0.007* 
  (2.99) (-1.97) (2.37) (2.36) (-0.17) (0.41) (-1.95) 
Analyst Following + 0.012 0.025* -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.89) (1.74) (-0.11) (-0.42) (0.11) (-1.45) (-0.76) 
InstOwn + 0.476 0.264 0.004 0.000 -0.104 -0.002 0.002 
  (1.30) (0.68) (0.34) (0.01) (-0.81) (-0.28) (1.05) 
Tangible + 3.969*** 2.767*** -0.075*** -0.021*** 0.372*** -0.002 -0.001 
  (5.75) (7.86) (-6.47) (-7.26) (3.39) (-0.42) (-0.36) 
Invest Volatility - 0.003 0.004 0.001* 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 
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  (0.26) (0.35) (1.74) (0.34) (1.41) (0.38) (0.44) 
Constant  1.270* 0.220 0.108*** 0.023*** -0.019 0.016 -0.013** 
  (1.86) (0.32) (4.95) (4.03) (-0.07) (0.79) (-1.99) 
          
Observations  4,394 3,629 3,467 3,628 4,542 2,797 3,002 
Pseudo R2  0.169        
R-squared   0.160 0.149 0.173 0.054 0.014 0.022 
Adj-R2   0.152 0.140 0.165 0.0462 0.00156 0.0105 
Fixed Effects 
  
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
This panel reports logit and OLS regression estimates of equation (5). Dependent variable in column (1) is an indicator which equals one if a firm provides at least one capex 
forecast. Dependent variables in columns (2) through (4) are level and (5) through (7) are changes. The numbers in parentheses are robust z-statistics and standard errors are 
clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, in two-tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are classified using Fama and French 12 
sectors. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
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Table 6 
Additional analysis 
 
Panel A. Additional analyses of finance committees and investment efficiency         
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Dep. var=Investment Inefficiency (Indicator variable) Dep. var=Investment Inefficiency (Change variable) 
         
Permanent Investment Committee 0.081    -0.375**    
 (0.83)    (-2.15)    
Temporary Investment Committee -0.319**    -0.457    
 (-2.01)    (-1.40)    
Finance Committee  0.038    -0.115   
  (0.41)    (-0.65)   
Finance Committee Adopt Year  0.275*    -1.356**   
  (1.71)    (-2.09)   
Large Finance Committee   0.108    -0.297  
   (1.04)    (-1.35)  
Small Finance Committee   0.010    -0.136  
   (0.10)    (-0.66)  
Strong Finance Committee    0.051    -0.303 
    (0.47)    (-1.41) 
Weak Finance Committee    0.063    -0.127 
    (0.60)    (-0.67) 
         
Observations 5,773 5,773 5,773 5,773 4,931 4,931 4,931 4,931 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.124 0.124 0.123     
R-squared     0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 
Adj-R2     0.00566 0.00660 0.00531 0.00532 
Fixed Effects Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industr
y Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This panel presents logit and OLS regression estimates of regressing investment inefficiency on a finance committee. The same control variables from Table 4 are included in the 
model but not tabulated for brevity. The numbers in parentheses are robust z-statistics and standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level respectively, in two-tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are classified using Fama and French 12 sectors. All other variables are defined in Appendix C.
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Panel B. Additional analyses of finance committees and capex guidance     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Dep. Var= Capex forecast error Dep. Var=∆Capex forecast error 
         
Permanent Investment Committee 0.001    -0.002    
 (0.14)    (-0.90)    
Temporary Investment Committee -0.014**    -0.007*    
 (-2.40)    (-1.83)    
Finance Committee  0.002    -0.003   
  (0.37)    (-1.22)   
Finance Committee Adopt Year 0.010    -0.001   
  (0.90)    (-0.05)   
Large Finance Committee   -0.000    -0.003  
   (-0.03)    (-0.96)  
Small Finance Committee   0.005    -0.003  
   (0.81)    (-1.09)  
Strong Finance Committee    -0.001    -0.004* 
    (-0.24)    (-1.69) 
Weak Finance Committee    0.006    -0.001 
    (0.84)    (-0.46) 
         
Observations 3,467 3,467 3,467 3,467 2,797 2,797 2,797 2,797 
R-squared 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.149 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
Adj-R2 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.00164 0.00150 0.00151 0.00180 
Fixed Effects Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Year & 
Industry 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This panel presents OLS regression estimates of regressing capex forecast error on a finance committee. The same control variables from Table 5 are included in the model but 
not tabulated for brevity. The numbers in parentheses are robust z-statistics and standard errors are clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level respectively, in two-tailed tests. Industry fixed effects are classified using Fama and French 12 sectors. All other variables are defined in Appendix C. 
 
